Abstract taken from Dissertation Abstracts International [?], Section History, Modern; ca. 1972, p. 1639-A:
Nonetheless, a Kreuzerkrieg strategy utilizing overseas bases was never officially adopted, primarily because the Kaiser had divided the Navy into [three?] separate but equal departments in 1889; and the three Navy heads were usually in conflict with each other. Only after 1897, when Admiral Tirpitz became State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt (Reich Navy Office) was a coherent strategy and ship-building program undertaken - [but?] Tirpitz was determined to build a battle fleet in home waters, and generally opposed further overseas commitments
The Navy's acquisition and administration of Kiaochow in China was a striking exception to this policy. Yet if this acquisition was incompatible with Tirpitz's battle fleet concept, it nonetheless served a valuable [function ?] in its own right, both as a base for the East Asiatic Cruiser Squadron, and to facilitate German commercial activity in the Orient. The [Navy?] intentionally limited the size of the Kiaochow protectorate, to avoid some of the problems with which the civilian administrators in the African colonies were faced; and it was no coincidence that the storm of controversy that arose concerning the civilian-administered territories left Kiaochow unscathed
The Navy was always conscious of its image as the military administrator of this colonial protectorate, and when a dispute arose regarding the [?] -Hochschule established there, Tirpitz fired Admiral \{Trup??], long time governor of Kiaochow, rather than jeopardize the political goodwill it had engendered. Before Kiaochow fell in 1914, the protectorate had come to signify the unique achievements of the German Navy in operating beyond its accustomed sphere
